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such as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission Human Rights, documents such as the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, and efforts to interact with regional civil society 
organizations. This system, which emerged in 2009, has come under intense scrutiny because 
the region’s human rights record has worsened since its inception. This paper examines the 
complex network of institutions, documents, and interactions between ASEAN member states 
and civil society organizations to determine the overall effectiveness of the organization’s 
efforts to safeguard human rights throughout the region. The paper begins with an overview of 
the role that regional intergovernmental organizations play in protecting human rights before 
examining the shortcomings of ASEAN’s human rights architecture. In particular, this 
examination will focus on the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, and ASEAN’s interactions with human rights-focused civil 
society organizations. Next, the paper evaluates the regional human rights systems in Europe, 
the Americas, and Africa in order to determine whether the shortcomings of ASEAN’s human 
rights system can be observed in other regional human rights systems. This comparison finds 
that ASEAN’s human rights system is uniquely weak in comparison with its counterparts in 
other regions. Finally, this paper concludes by providing policy recommendations for 
strengthening ASEAN’s human rights system before subsequently explaining difficulties 
associated with passing potential reforms. 
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Introduction 
 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional intergovernmental 
organization (IGO) which consists of ten treaty-bound member states: Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
Collectively, these states are playing an increasingly prominent role on the global stage because 
they contain approximately 8.59% of the world’s population1 and have a combined GDP which 
exceeds $2.6 trillion.2 Furthermore, the economies of ASEAN’s member states are projected to 
grow at a torrid pace in the near future due to a rapidly emerging middle class and a sizeable 
labor force inside the economies of its member states.3 Unsurprisingly, the international 
community has turned its attention to ASEAN as a result of its emergence as a critical political 
and economic bloc in the international community. 
A side effect of this rapid emergence, however, is increased scrutiny of its member 
states’ questionable human rights records. Many of ASEAN’s member states have shown signs 
of “shown increasing signs of human rights violations or moves away from democracy” within 
the past decade.4 While the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar is responsible for many of the most 
extreme violations of human rights during this time frame, there are many other violations 
                                                     
1 United Nations Population Division, 2017 Total Population – Both Sexes V1 (New York, NY, 21 June 2017), 
distributed by the United Nations Population Division, 
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DVD/Files/1_Indicators%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2017_POP_F
01_1_TOTAL_POPULATION_BOTH_SEXES.xlsx. 
2 “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): 12 Things to Know,” Asian Development Bank, last 
modified November 8, 2017, https://www.adb.org/features/asean-12-things-know. 
3 David Wijeratne, “How to Keep the ASEAN Economies Growing for Another 50 Years,” World Economic Forum, 
September 8, 2018, accessed February 24, 2019, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/09/to-keep-growing-
aseans-economy-must-adapt-heres-how/. 
4 Vincent Bevins, “It’s not just Burma: Human rights are under attack across Southeast Asia, advocates say,” 
Washington Post, September 8, 2017. 
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occurring in other member states as well. Thailand’s rapid backslide from a burgeoning 
democracy into a military junta, Cambodia’s recent moves to dissolve opposing political parties, 
and the Philippines’ initiatives to encourage extrajudicial killings as a part of President Rodrigo 
Duterte’s “drug war” are just a few examples of human rights crises that have emerged in other 
ASEAN member states over the course of the past decade. In response to increased scrutiny of 
human rights abuses in the region, ASEAN’s member states convened the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009 and drafted the ASEAN 
Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) in 2012. 
In this paper, I examine the effectiveness of ASEAN’s initiatives to promote and protect 
human rights within its member states. In Chapter One, I provide a brief overview of the 
international human rights landscape, examine the role that regional IGOs play in promoting 
and protecting human rights, and propose an evaluation scheme to determine the effectiveness 
of a particular regional IGO’s ability to ensure that member states uphold human rights. In 
Chapter Two, I provide an overview of ASEAN’s efforts to explicitly protect human rights; in 
particular, this chapter will focus on the AICHR and the AHRD. Furthermore, this chapter will 
also present a case study of ASEAN’s response to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar to highlight 
the flaws of the organization’s human rights architecture. In Chapter Three, I evaluate ASEAN’s 
initiatives to promote civil society organizations within its member states, which matters 
because civil society plays a critical role in the process of persuading states to accept human 
rights norms. Using the findings from the previous two chapters, I evaluate the overall efficacy 
of ASEAN’s human rights mechanisms before subsequently comparing its efforts to promote 
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and protect human rights to those of other regional IGOs in Chapter Four. Finally, in the 
concluding section, I summarize my findings and provide policy recommendations for ASEAN. 
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Chapter One  
Background: How Can the Effectiveness of Regional Intergovernmental 
Organizations in Protecting Human Rights be Evaluated? 
 This chapter explores the role that IGOs – organizations containing states that are legally 
bound together by a treaty – play in the creation of norms related to human rights. First, I will 
provide background information about the complex relationship between human rights and 
international law. Next, I will explain the role that IGOs play in promoting and protecting human 
rights through their roles as watchdogs and norm diffusers. Finally, I will delve into a discussion 
of the unique role that regional IGOs play in the international human rights architecture before 
subsequently establishing metrics to evaluate the efficacy of these bodies to encourage their 
member states to protect human rights. 
a. Background on the Codification of Human Rights in International Law and the Role of 
IGOs 
 Over time, human rights have grown to become a fundamental pillar of international 
law. While international human rights law is unique because it reflects a state’s obligations to 
its domestic population rather than to other states, it suffers from many of the same challenges 
of enforceability and compliance as other branches of international law. While most states 
claim to respect and protect the human rights of their citizens, few consistently meet all of the 
obligations and standards that are codified in international law. Furthermore, several states 
acknowledge the existence of international human rights law, but they do not accept its 
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legitimacy. Unsurprisingly, this gap between the codification of human rights norms in 
international law and state compliance is a result of a complicated legal landscape.5 
 International human rights law can primarily be found in two types of documents: 
binding treaties and non-binding forms of “soft law.” Binding treaties are statements of law 
which specify enforceable legal obligations for states. Binding human rights treaties, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), are significant because they can 
force states to change aspects of their territorial sovereignty. This characteristic of treaties is 
important because states cite violations of sovereignty as a justification for failing to ratify 
treaties  or choosing to ratify a treaty with significant reservations (which occurs when states 
ratify a treaty, but opt out of specific provisions).6  Non-binding forms of “soft law,” meanwhile, 
are primarily aspirational documents which codify norms into international law without legally 
obligating states to adhere to them. While documents such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) are useful because they codify human rights norms into international 
law, they do not have the power to compel states to commit to certain courses of action.7 
 As is the case with other areas of international law, the lack of enforceability is one of 
the most glaring weaknesses of international human rights law. IGOs with bodies responsible 
for protecting human rights, such as the UN’s Human Rights Council, lack the ability to police or 
prosecute states that consistently violate human rights.8 As a result, these bodies employ “light 
touch” enforcement mechanisms in which states are shamed for their human rights violations, 
                                                     
5 Rhona K. M. Smith, “Human Rights in International Law,” in Human Rights Politics and Practice 3rd Edition, ed. 
Michael Goodhart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 61. 
6 Ibid, 64. 
7 Ibid,   
8 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, “International Regimes for Human Rights,” Annual Review of Political Science 15 (2012), 
266. 
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but do not face formal penalties or sanctions. This tactic is adopted because international 
human rights bodies do not wish to alienate states from the international human rights system 
altogether; it is more beneficial for the long-term prospects of international human rights for 
imperfect states to participate in the system than for states to completely opt-out of the 
system due to concerns about infringement on sovereignty. Furthermore, these bodies are 
limited to forms of “light touch” enforcement largely because their scope of enforcement is 
limited to a specific, narrowly defined set of powers by the treaties which establish their 
existence.9 
 In spite of the problems associated with enforceability, however, the codification of 
human rights in international law has allowed for a process known by scholars as “norm 
diffusion” to occur. Norms, defined by Finnemore as “collectively held ideas about behavior”10 
which are “shared and social,”11 are diffused through the international system and are adopted 
by states as a result of concerted efforts by IGOs to encourage states to adopt certain courses 
of action.12 Once the norm is diffused by states, states subsequently internalize the norm and 
follow its associated rules of behavior.  
IGOs are involved in the process of diffusing norms related to human rights in two 
distinct ways. First, they have the ability to directly as “norm diffusers” that encourage states to 
adopt certain rules of behavior. For example, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) has successfully diffused norms related to the treatment of ethnic minorities 
                                                     
9 Smith, “Human Rights in International Law,” 71. 
10 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 23. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Susan Park, “Theorizing Norm Diffusion Within International Organizations,” International Politics 43, no. 3 
(2006), 343. 
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within its member states by conducting seminars ran by independent experts in member 
states.13  
Second, IGOs can support the creation and diffusion of new norms through efforts to 
support civil society organizations in their member states. These efforts are important because 
Finnemore and Sikkink have identified civil society organizations as critical “norm 
entrepreneurs,” which means that they possess the ability to introduce new norms and 
persuade states to adopt them. Once these actors convince enough states to adopt a particular 
norm, the authors assert that a “tipping point” is reached and a “norm cascade” encourages 
others to gradually adopt the norm.14 The spread of norms related to women’s suffrage 
illustrates the important role that civil society plays in the creation and dissemination of norms. 
The International Women’s Suffrage Association (IWSA), an international non-governmental 
organization, launched a worldwide campaign to encourage states to grant women the right to 
vote. This campaign, as well as several other overlapping campaigns, managed to persuade 
enough states to adopt women’s suffrage that the norm reached a “tipping point” in 1930. 
After 1930, states began to adopt such measures at an increasingly rapid pace. IWSA, as well as 
other civil society organizations involved in the international women’s suffrage movement, 
served as “norm entrepreneurs” because they launched campaigns to convince states to adopt 
provisions granting women the right to vote.15 While IGOs are unlikely to serve as “norm 
entrepreneurs,”16 they have the ability to spearhead efforts to promote the activities of local 
                                                     
13 Steven Ratner, “Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict,” NYU Journal of International Law 
32 (2000), 646. 
14 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International 
Organization vol. 52, no. 4 (1998), 895. 
15 Ibid, 896. 
16 Park, “Theorizing Norm Diffusion Within International Organizations,”  
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civil society organizations and international non-governmental organizations within their 
member states by lending them financial support or through giving them spaces to formally 
advocate for their causes. Through supporting civil society efforts to address issues related to 
human rights, IGOs can play an indirect role in assisting “norm entrepreneurs.”17 
The international human rights system, unsurprisingly, is complex because it consists of 
a vast network of laws, norms, and institutions. IGOs, in particular, are unique actors because 
they have the ability to both directly enforce human rights law and indirectly promote the 
spread of new human rights norms. At the same time, however, they must also grapple with 
their limited enforcement capabilities and in many cases, an inability to issue binding 
declarations which force states to alter their behavior. Ultimately IGOs are complex actors with 
the ability to significantly influence the international human rights landscape. 
b. The Role of Regional IGOs in the International Human Rights System 
In addition to the UN human rights system, many regional IGOs have established human 
rights bodies, such as the Organization of American States’ American Commission on Human 
Rights and the Council of Europe’s European Court of Human Rights. Much like their global 
counterparts, these regional bodies are responsible for enforcing human rights treaties within 
their member states. Importantly, rather than ensuring compliance with global treaties, these 
bodies are primarily responsible for enforcing regional human rights treaties such as the 
American Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the European Convention of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In terms of protected rights and freedoms, regional treaties 
                                                     
17 Thomas Buergenthal, “The Evolving International Human Rights System,” American Journal of International Law 
100, no. 4 (2006), 804. 
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bear striking resemblance to those codified in the UDHR, ICCPR, and subsequent global 
treaties.18 
The UN human rights system has undoubtedly played a significant role in influencing the 
legal norms which underpin the international human rights system; furthermore, it also plays 
an important role in making sure that the broader international community is on the same page 
in terms of human rights norms.19 At the same time, however, there are a multitude of strategic 
benefits that can be derived from deferring to regional human rights bodies. First, regional 
human rights bodies have the ability to adopt language in their respective human rights treaties 
that accounts for their cultural context. For instance, the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights includes provisions to protect “collective peoples’” rights. Since regional human 
rights bodies are able to adopt language in their foundational documents which reflects cultural 
context, member states are more likely to view such bodies as legitimate.2021 Second, regional 
bodies are more effective at applying “peer pressure” on member states to comply with human 
rights law in comparison to their global counterparts. This effectiveness stems from the fact 
that in comparison to international bodies such as the UN, regional bodies contain a smaller 
number of member states which share common historical, cultural, and political 
characteristics.22 As a result, the “peer pressure” from regional human rights bodies tends to be 
more credible compared to pressure from their global counterparts. 
                                                     
18 Smith, “Human Rights in International Law,” 73. 
19 Buergenthal, “The Evolving International Human Rights System,” 791. 
20 Ibid, 792. 
21 Smith, “Human Rights in International Law,” 73. 
22 Ibid. 
 10 
In spite of these benefits, however, regional human rights bodies are imperfect, 
especially in the realm of enforcing human rights treaties. A vast majority of regional human 
rights bodies, with the exception of the European Court of Human Rights, lack the ability to 
punish against states which violate human rights. This important omission of power means that 
regional human rights bodies suffer from an inability to act as a direct enforcer of human rights 
provisions.  In spite of this, however, regional IGOs and their associated human rights bodies 
are still critical actors in the international human rights architecture because they are more 
effective as potential norm diffusers in comparison to their global counterparts. 
c. How Should the Effectiveness of Regional IGOs be Evaluated? 
The previous two sections established the roles of IGOs within the broader international 
human rights landscape and explored the unique role that regional human rights bodies can 
play in the protection and promotion of human rights. The previous analysis can also be used to 
establish a metric for evaluating the effectiveness of regional IGOs in facilitating the protection 
of human rights. As discussed in the prior two sections of this chapter, IGOs primarily do this 
through the creation of direct enforcement mechanisms or through promoting the existence of 
civil society organizations in their member states. Thus, this paper will evaluate the ability of 
regional IGOs to directly ensure that states comply with key human rights provisions as well as 
their efforts to support civil society organizations within their member states. 
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Chapter Two  
Evaluating the Effectiveness of ASEAN’s Formal Human Rights Institutions 
 This chapter aims to evaluate the effectiveness of ASEAN’s formal institutions designed 
to protect human rights. First, I will begin by providing historical background on the evolution of 
ASEAN’s formal human rights mechanisms and initiatives. Next, I will provide an overview of 
the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission of Human 
Rights and discuss their respective structural flaws. Afterward, I will discuss the influence of the 
norm of non-interference and its influence over how ASEAN addresses human rights violations 
committed by member states. Finally, I will conclude by providing a case study about ASEAN’s 
response to the Rohingya genocide which is occurring in Myanmar to highlight how the 
institutional deficiencies of the organization’s human rights regime lead to an insufficient 
response to human rights crises within member states. 
a. Historical Evolution of ASEAN’s Human Rights Mechanisms: From Asian Values to 
Internationalization of Human Rights 
 In the years following the conclusion of the Cold War, Western countries began to place 
considerable pressure on Southeast Asian states to adopt policies in line with liberal values, 
which included demonstrating a commitment to the protection of human rights. In response, 
these countries initially resisted adherence to such norms and asserted that there were a set of 
“Asian values” which conflicted with Western human rights norms. This discourse, which 
originated in the early 1990s, was both a defensive reaction against increasing pressure for 
liberalization and an attempt to piece together common strands of thought from different 
cultures in order to create the appearance of Southeast Asia as a unified bloc capable of 
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providing an alternative model of governance in contrast to the West.23 Key principles asserted 
in Asian values discourse included the importance of community over individual rights, respect 
for authority, and social cohesion over individual interests. Singapore and Malaysia – the two 
states viewed as the main proponents of this school of thought – argued that such values 
played critical roles in their rapid economic growth that occurred over the course of the prior 
two decades.24 
 Importantly, the emergence of Asian values ideology drew criticism from academics, 
activists, and political leaders from both inside and outside the region. Scholars, minority 
groups, and indigenous peoples in ASEAN member states all spoke out against this line of 
discourse by arguing that this ideology simply existed for the purpose of justifying domestic 
repression under the guise of being necessary for development.25 Furthermore, Western 
political leaders and scholars criticized the notion of Asian values as being a selective 
interpretation of social and political norms design to legitimize authoritarian regimes. Sen, in 
particular, argued that “so-called Asian values that are used to justify authoritarianism are not 
Asian in any particular sense”26 and that the appearance of the notions of individual rights in 
Western writings does not delegitimize the claims to freedom and liberty that citizens of ASEAN 
member states may possess.27  
 This debate, while contentious, faded from the international arena in the late 1990s as a 
result of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The crisis caused almost all ASEAN member states to 
                                                     
23 Philip Eldridge, The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia (New York: Routledge, 2002), 32. 
24 Ibid, 33. 
25 Ibid, 35.  
26 Amartya Sen, “Human Rights and Asian Values,” The New Republic, July 14-21, 1997, 
https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/morgenthau/254. 
27 Ibid. 
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slip into deep recessions, which sparked social unrest and widespread protests amongst 
workers in most countries. As a result, state leaders were to adapt their policies to the 
demands of their citizens.28 Furthermore, the crisis showed that adherence to Asian values 
could not guarantee sustainable economic growth and thus refuted many of this ideology’s 
core tenets.29 As a result, the debate over the existence of separate Asian values was 
significantly subdued by the end of the decade. 
 The financial crisis and subsequent collapse of Asian values discourse forced ASEAN 
member states to alter their stance on human rights and engage with the international human 
rights regime. In the years leading up to the crisis, however, pressure from the international 
community had already forced political leaders in Southeast Asia to gradually make concessions 
on this issue area. In consultation with the UN in 1993, several Asian states signed the Bangkok 
Declaration, which affirmed the universality of human rights30 and reaffirmed the commitment 
of signatory parties to “principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.”31 While this declaration represented an important 
step because it was the first major instance in which ASEAN member states formally engaged 
with the international human rights regime, it served as an imperfect human rights document. 
The declaration alluded to the idea of regional exceptionalism through its simultaneous 
affirmation of the principle of non-interference32 and the assertion that human rights “must be 
                                                     
28 Eldridge, The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia, 42. 
29 Gerd Langguth, “Asian Values Revisited,” Asia Europe Journal 1, no. 1 (2003), 27. 
30 Eldridge, The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia, 61. 
31 United Nations, “Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights,” 
conclusion date: April 2nd, 1993, 1, http://faculty.washington.edu/swhiting/pols469/Bangkok_Declaration.doc. 
32 Ibid. 
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considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting.”33 
These provisions are inherently contradictory because they affirm that while human rights are 
universal, implementation is not a priority due to the region’s unique historical, economic, and 
social backgrounds.34 Despite this document’s imperfections, however, it was still impactful 
because it served as the first instance in which the regional community explicitly recognized the 
importance of adhering to human rights norms. Later that year, the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Association adopted the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Human Rights, which reiterated many 
key themes of both the Bangkok Declaration and the Vienna Declaration adopted at the World 
Conference on Human Rights.35 In addition to these international agreements, individual ASEAN 
member states also began to formally engage with the international human rights regime as a 
result of pressure from the international community. Several ASEAN member states have 
engaged in formal discussions with the UNHCR about how to improve human rights conditions 
in their countries; furthermore, multiple member states have also established national human 
rights institutions in response to international pressure as well.36  
Ultimately, a combination of political and economic pressures forced ASEAN member 
states to address human rights concerns. The initial steps of the Bangkok Declaration, the Kuala 
Lumpur Declaration on Human Rights, and the measures taken by individual member states to 
protect human rights all set the stage for increasingly bold and groundbreaking steps to ensure 
the protection of human rights. In 2007, human rights were codified as an organizational 
                                                     
33 Ibid, 2. 
34 Eldridge, The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia, 61. 
35 Ibid, 89. 
36 Ibid. 
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priority in Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter, which called on member states to establish a 
regional human rights body.37 This led to the eventual creation of the AICHR in 2009 and the 
passage of the AHRD in 2012. 
b. Evaluation of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was established in 
2009 as a regional human rights body for the purpose of protecting and promoting human 
rights within Southeast Asia. The body meets twice a year and consists of a group of ten 
representatives – one per member state. The body’s most notable accomplishment is the 
successful negotiation of the passage of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration because it 
represented the first time that international human rights norms were formally codified into 
law in an ASEAN document. In particular, the body’s proponents argue that the passage of this 
declaration was a cornerstone moment in the history of human rights in Southeast Asia 
because it represented the first time that the organization’s ten member states with vastly 
different political structures and cultural norms reached significant agreement on the 
importance of protecting and codifying rights. Furthermore, these proponents also argue that 
the passage of the Declaration could serve as an important first step for the further diffusion of 
human rights norms throughout the region.38 
Despite these successes, however, there are five major structural flaws which prevent 
the body from being an effective regional human rights body. First, the body’s Terms of 
                                                     
37 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Charter, Singapore: November 2007, 19, 
http://asean.org/storage/images/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf. 
38 Michelle Staggs Kelsall, “The New ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights: Toothless Tiger or 
Tentative First Step,” Analysis from the East-West Center no. 90 (2009), 2. 
 16 
Reference stipulate that ought to focus on the promotion of human rights rather than on their 
protection in the ASEAN region. While the promotion of human rights norms is undoubtedly a 
noble goal, this provision undermines the ability of the AICHR to serve as an authoritative 
regional voice that can name and shame specific states or actors which violate human rights. 
Second, the AICHR’s Terms of Reference also stipulate that it only has the power to serve as an 
advisory body to the ASEAN Secretariat, which means that it does not possess any meaningful 
ability to enforce decisions or punish consistent violators of human rights.39 Third, unlike other 
regional human rights bodies, the AICHR does not currently have a formal mechanism for 
receiving complaints of human rights abuses. The absence of a formal complaints mechanism 
means that there is currently no way for individuals or civil society organizations to report 
human rights abuses to the body. This oversight significantly contributes to the ineffectiveness 
of the AICHR because the body cannot adequately respond to allegations of human rights 
abuses if it does not have a mechanism to collect information about them in the first place.40 
Fourth, the representatives appointed to the body by each member state are not independent; 
they “remain accountable to their appointing governments” and can thus be withdrawn at any 
time.41 Fifth, the AICHR’s Terms of Reference mandate a reliance upon consensus-based 
decision-making. Given the wide range of political systems and cultural norms encompassed by 
ASEAN’s ten member states, this form of decision-making is particularly problematic because 
they will either fail to reach a consensus or reach a consensus which represents a weak 
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response to serious human rights violations.42 Furthermore, consensus-based decision-making 
is harmful because it essentially gives member states veto power, which means that consistent 
human rights violators possess the ability to block any proposed forms of punitive action.43 
In sum, while the AICHR has had some successes in promoting discourse related to 
human rights norms, it still has work to do in order to become a body that can serve as a 
catalyst for protecting human rights in the region. In particular, the structure of the body ties 
the hands of its member states and prevents it from taking action against human rights 
violations in the region. 
c. Evaluation of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
In 2012, the AICHR and its representatives appointed by ASEAN member states worked 
to draft the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). This document represented the first 
instance in which member states with vastly different histories and commitments in regard to 
human rights had agreed to a specific, shared set of principles on this issue area.44 Even though 
the passage of this document served as an important milestone in the history of human rights 
in Southeast Asia, its drafting process was fraught with controversy. Since the document was 
drafted by the AICHR, outside observers were concerned that its representatives, which were 
appointed by the governments of ASEAN member states, would not act in a fully independent 
manner during the drafting process because the body’s Terms of Reference stipulate that they 
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can be withdrawn by their appointing government at any time.45 Furthermore, the drafting 
process was conducted almost entirely in secret; neither drafts of the document nor the terms 
of reference provided to human rights experts involved in the drafting process were officially 
made available to the public. Furthermore, regional civil society organizations were largely 
excluded from the drafting process until the document was complete, which meant that the 
process of drafting the document was largely insular. 46 The UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights even went so far as to criticize the drafting process on the grounds that it was anti-
democratic, noting it was “not the hallmark of the democratic global governance to which 
ASEAN aspires”47 and that it would “undermine the respect and ownership that such an 
important declaration deserves.”48 
The document itself, according to drafters, was created with the goal of upholding 
standards of the UDHR while also acknowledging the regional context in which the document 
was drafted. In some respects, the drafters were successful in achieving this goal. Articles 10 
and 26 of the AHRD affirm civil and political rights as well as economic, cultural, and social 
rights codified in the UDHR.4950 In some instances, the AHRD actually expands upon the scope 
of these rights. Article 4 of the AHRD, for example, affirms that the rights of women, children, 
the elderly, and persons with disabilities as an “inalienable, integral, and indivisible part of 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms.”51 In other parts of the document, rights codified in 
the UDHR are clarified for specific regional contexts. Article 13 of the AHRD, for instance, 
expands upon the UDHR’s provisions which prohibit slavery by adding a reference the 
“smuggling and trafficking in persons, including for the purpose of trafficking in human 
organs.”52 The drafters of the AHRD were able to successfully achieve some of their goals 
through the inclusion of provisions which reaffirm, expand, or clarify rights initially found in the 
UDHR. 
At the same time, however, the document itself is deeply flawed due to provisions 
which undermine the universality of human rights. Article 6 of the AHRD stipulates that “the 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be balanced with the performance 
of corresponding duties as every person has responsibilities to all other individuals, the 
community and the society where one lives.”53 While the recognition of duties itself in the 
document is not a cause for concern since nearly all human rights instruments contain 
references to them, the idea that human rights duties must be “balanced” against other duties 
was a cause for alarm amongst human rights advocates and regional civil society organizations. 
International human rights advocates found this language to be troubling because it harkens 
back to Asian values discourse which emphasizes that individual rights are less important than 
obligations to the family, community, or broader society.54 
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In addition to concerns over the language related to balancing duties, the document 
also contains language which places conditions on the universality of human rights. Article 7 of 
the AHRD stipulates that “all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent, and 
interrelated,” while also noting that “at the same time, the realization of human rights must be 
considered in the regional and national context bearing in mind different political, economic, 
legal, social, cultural, historical and religious backgrounds.”55 Critics of the AHRD denounced 
this provision on the grounds that it could potentially be invoked to justify the violation of 
human rights on the grounds of cultural relativism. While this provision contains references to 
the unique regional context of Southeast Asia, it does not seem to explicitly allow states to use 
this justification to violate human rights. Importantly, Article 6 of the AHRD improves on the 
language of universality present in the Bangkok Declaration, which qualifies that “while human 
rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving 
process.”56 The removal of the word “while,” which was seen as a qualifying word by 
international human rights advocates, from the AHRD’s version of this provision signifies 
progress on the question of regional exceptionalism. Article 7 of the AHRD is still imperfect 
because the language which implies the acceptance of cultural relativism as a justification for 
failing to uphold human rights is present; however, it is clear that progress has been made on 
this issue.57 
Finally, critics of that the AHRD’s limitations clause argue that it undermines the overall 
effectiveness of the document. Article 8, which contains the clauses, states that: 
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“The human rights and fundamental freedoms of every person shall be exercised with 
due regard to the rights and duties of others. The exercise of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by 
law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition for the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of others and to meet the just requirements of national security, 
public order, public health, and public morality and the general welfare of the peoples in 
a democratic society.”58 
 
This article contains several provisions which limit the universality of human rights; in 
particular, it stipulates that human rights can be subject to limitations on the grounds of 
national security, public order, public health, and public morality. While the UDHR has a similar 
limitations clause,59 international human rights advocates and regional civil society 
organizations objected to the placement of this clause in the “General Principles” section in the 
document because it could potentially allow these limitations to apply to all rights, including 
those deemed as non-derogable under international law. Furthermore, several regional civil 
society organizations (most prominently, the Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law, and 
Development) opposed the inclusion of “public morality” as a limitation because it could be 
used as a justification for states to undermine women’s rights. These critics argued that the 
“morality” implied by this clause refers to the dominant patriarchal culture of many countries in 
the region, which reinforces norms which favored men in power at the expense of women. 60 
The inclusion of “national security” in Article 8 also caused alarm amongst regional civil society 
organizations for similar reasons; in particular, they feared that national security could be used 
as a vague justification for continued human rights abuses. Importantly, regional civil society 
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organizations were not alarmed over the language in Article 8 in isolation because many other 
human rights documents allow for limitations in extreme emergencies. Rather, these 
organizations were alarmed over the language in the context of previous human rights abuses 
and cultural norms in Southeast Asia that could be interpreted as a justification for allowing 
abuses of human rights to continue. 
The passage of the AHRD represented an important step in the development of human 
rights in Southeast Asia; however, this document has not played a significant role in improving 
human rights in the region. First, as pointed out previously, there are several provisions 
throughout the document which allow states to derogate on rights in the UDHR that are viewed 
as non-derogable under any circumstances. Second, since the document is a declaration rather 
than a treaty, it is non-binding by nature. This important characteristic means that while states 
can sign the document and appear to commit to upholding human rights, there is no legal 
obligation for them to actually follow through on those commitments. Furthermore, since the 
AICHR does not have the ability to punish states that consistently violate human rights, there 
would be no institutional mechanism available to punish states which consistently violate 
provisions of the treaty. Therefore, the passage of the AHRD should not be viewed as a 
document which played a significant role in advancing human rights in the region because it is 
not an ironclad document which fails to force states to commit to the protection of human 
rights. This skepticism is especially justified given the extensive tradition of states with 
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extensive histories of human rights violations signing declarations and treaties in response to 
international pressure.61 
d. The Role of the Norm of Non-Interference  
It is clear that the AICHR’s lack of an enforcement mechanism and the AHRD’s various 
provisions which allow states to opt-out of certain human rights obligations are due to a lack of 
political will to address issues related to human rights. This phenomenon can be explained by 
ASEAN’s rigid adherence to the norm of non-interference, which stipulates that ASEAN should 
not intervene in the domestic affairs of its member states in accordance with the basic tenets 
of sovereignty.62 ASEAN upholds this norm by refusing to explicitly intervene in the internal 
affairs of member states. Rather, if the organization believes the internal affairs of one of its 
member states is problematic, it will publicly criticize the member states or engage in backdoor 
negotiations in an attempt to address the problem. Such practices were used to spur political 
reforms in Cambodia and Myanmar in the 1990s before they officially joined ASEAN.63 The one 
notable exception to this norm is when security issues threaten to undermine regional stability; 
for instance, ASEAN member states (Thailand, Philippines, and Singapore) intervened in 1999 to 
stabilize East Timor after it erupted in violence following a referendum for independence from 
Indonesia.64 While the norm of non-interference is seemingly simple, the actual behavior of 
ASEAN member states reflects a more complex reality. ASEAN member states will apply 
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pressure to problematic member states and only pursue intervention in cases where it is 
necessary for regional stability. In the realm of human rights, this means that ASEAN is likely to 
directly intervene or punish member states for violations unless they directly affect regional 
stability. 
The existence of the norm of non-interference affects ASEAN’s efforts to promote and 
protect human rights in two ways. First, the existence of this norm likely impacted the drafting 
process of both the AICHR’s Terms of Reference and the AHRD. In particular, the limited 
advisory role of the AICHR and its reliance upon consensus-based decision-making reflect the 
core tenets of this norm. The AHRD’s status as a declaration rather than a treaty is likely a result 
of this norm as well; a legally binding treaty would require an enforcement mechanism that 
ASEAN currently lacks. Second, the existence of this norm prevents ASEAN from taking drastic 
steps, such as humanitarian intervention or the imposition of sanctions, to address serious 
violations of human rights. Essentially, the norm of non-interference serves as another 
institutional obstacle to meaningful responses to allegations of human rights abuses in ASEAN 
member stats. 
e. Case Study: ASEAN Response to Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar 
This section of the chapter will employ a case study of ASEAN’s response to the 
Rohingya crisis in Myanmar to highlight the ineffectiveness of its internal processes and 
practices for addressing major human rights violations. First, this section begins with a brief 
overview of the Rohingya crisis and the key provisions of the UDHR and the AHRD that 
Myanmar has allegedly violated. Next, this section will provide background about how ASEAN 
has historically addressed human rights violations in Myanmar before then delving into how 
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ASEAN has specifically responded to the Rohingya crisis. Finally, this section will conclude by 
analyzing the institutional factors that prevent ASEAN from mounting a robust response to the 
crisis and its associated human rights violations. 
The Rohingya people are a Muslim-majority ethnic group concentrated along 
Myanmar’s northwestern Rakhine State, which shares a border with Bangladesh’s Chittagong 
Division.65 The Rohingya, who make up just 1.5% of the overall Myanmar population, are ethnic 
and religious minorities whose overall population is dwarfed by the country’s overwhelmingly 
Buddhist majority.66 Tensions between Muslim Rohingyas and Buddhist Burmese date back to 
World War II because the two groups supported opposing sides; the former supported the 
British, while the latter supported the Japanese.67 These tensions worsened when Myanmar 
was on the cusp of independence in 1967 as a result of Rohingya leaders campaigning for the 
creation of an independent state Muslim-majority state in Arakan, which is a region within the 
current Rakhine State. This violent separatist campaign further enflamed tensions between the 
two groups and provided the state, which is primarily governed by its Buddhist Burmese 
majority, a justification for taking retaliatory measures against the Rohingya.68 
Since Myanmar has gained independence, it has persistently engaged in campaigns of 
repression targeting the Rohingya. The passage of a “Citizenship Law” in 1982, according to 
Human Rights Watch, “effectively . . . [denied] the Rohingya the possibility of acquiring a 
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nationality”69 and classified them as “resident foreigners.”70 This legal status means that 
Rohingya are subject to abuses such as restrictions on movement, arbitrary confiscation of 
property, forced labor, and ineligibility for public office. Furthermore, the government of 
Myanmar has also placed restrictions on the religious freedoms of Rohingya Muslims; 
authorities regularly conduct inspections and subsequently “fine or imprison those who 
conduct organized prayers in their own homes.”71 
In addition to these abuses, the government of Myanmar has also begun to engage in 
active campaigns of violence against the Rohingya people. In August 2017, Myanmar’s military 
launched a large-scale ethnic cleansing campaign against Rakhine State’s Rohingya population 
in response to attacks by local separatist groups. Military units and local militias attacked 
Rohingya villages, carried out systematic campaigns of mass sexual assault, and committed 
widespread massacres. More than 100,000 Rohingya individuals were internally displaced as a 
result of the actions of Myanmar’s military.72 Additionally, these campaigns also generated a 
massive refugee crisis; more than 730,000 Rohingya have fled to refugee camps in neighboring 
Bangladesh in order to escape persecution. Conditions within these Bangladeshi camps are 
notoriously poor as well; a lack of funds dedicated towards refugee camps has led to shortages 
of food, water, and medical supplies.73 Furthermore, poor sanitary conditions and a lack of 
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medical resources in these Bangladeshi camps have led to outbreaks of deadly and highly-
communicable diseases such as measles, cholera, and diphtheria.74 
Myanmar’s mistreatment of the Rohingya people, perhaps unsurprisingly, violates a 
slew of AHRD provisions. Most violations are classified as infringements upon the civil and 
political rights covered by the AHRD. In particular, the abuses documented earlier in this section 
constitute violations of the Rohingya’s right to personal security (Article 12 of the AHRD),75 their 
“right to freedom of movement” (Article 15 of the AHRD),76 their right to a nationality (Article 
18 of the AHRD),77 and their right to freedom of religion (Article 22 of the AHRD).78 
Furthermore, the refugee crisis generated by Myanmar’s actions towards the Rohingya has led 
to violations of economic, social, and cultural rights that are protected in the document. In 
particular, the fact that Rohingya refugees have been forced to migrate to refugee camps 
characterized by poor conditions constitutes a violation of their “right to an adequate standard 
of living” (Article 28).79 Furthermore, since Rohingya children cannot attend public school, their 
right to an education is being violated as well (Article 31).80 Importantly, while the AHRD is not 
a binding document, it serves as a useful roadmap for determining specific human rights 
violations that Myanmar commits. Furthermore, since the AICHR is ASEAN’s primary human 
rights body and was heavily involved in the process of drafting this document, it would be 
logical for the body to use it as a basis for pursuing action against Myanmar. 
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Historically, ASEAN has struggled to pursue a coherent policy to address Myanmar, 
which it has viewed as “an embarrassment to the values and ideology”81 of the organization. 
Initially, ASEAN adopted a policy of “constructive” engagement towards Myanmar and its ruling 
military junta’s questionable human rights record. In 1997, the organization offered 
membership to Myanmar in exchange for an agreement to engage with the international 
human rights regime.82 This policy was pursued in hopes that ASEAN could discreetly encourage 
Myanmar to adopt democratic reforms and improve its human rights record through backdoor 
negotiations. When this policy failed to lead to meaningful change, ASEAN began to criticize 
Myanmar in public forums in hopes of pressuring its ruling military junta to enact reforms. 
More forceful methods of engaging with the military junta, such as punishment, never gained 
serious traction within the organization.83  
Myanmar eventually implemented several semi-democratic reforms in 2010, but there 
is no evidence to suggest that “constructive engagement” played a significant role in spurring 
this change. While the literature suggests a multitude of causes for Myanmar’s pursuit of 
reforms, none of them point to ASEAN’s policy of “constructive engagement” as the main 
reason that the military junta pursued democratic reforms. Some scholars argue that reform 
was a result of Myanmar’s military junta pursuing power-sharing strategies to overcome the 
dangers of internal factionalism.8485 Others contend that the transition was spurred by 
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Myanmar’s sputtering economy86 or a desire to entrench the ruling military junta’s power while 
simultaneously establishing international legitimacy.87 Regardless of the main cause of 
transition cited by scholars, it is clear that ASEAN played at most a minimal role in spurring 
Myanmar’s semi-democratic transition. This case shows that internal pressure, which is 
ASEAN’s preferred method of convincing problematic member states to change their behavior 
given the existence of the norm of non-interference, is not extremely effective. This is 
especially true considering that the current regime in Myanmar is still guilty of many human 
rights violations that are unrelated to the Rohingya crisis, such as the imprisonment of 
journalists.88  
ASEAN’s strategies to address the Rohingya crisis follow precedents set by its previous 
engagement in Myanmar. The AICHR’s response to human rights violations associated with the 
crisis so far has largely been consistent with the core ideas of “constructive engagement” 
because most of its efforts related to the crisis have been related to facilitating discussion 
between Burmese representatives and leadership figures within ASEAN. In 2013, for instance, 
the AICHR dedicated time during a summit in Myanmar to discuss the Rohingya crisis and 
potential solutions.89 More recently, in 2018, the AICHR representatives of ASEAN’s two largest 
Muslim-majority member states (Indonesia and Malaysia) released a joint statement which 
called on the body to take an increasingly proactive approach to address the crisis. In particular, 
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the two representatives called on the body to review measures that could be implemented to 
bring peace and “promote harmony and reconciliation between the various ethnic communities 
of Myanmar.90 This initial pressure eventually snowballed and caused more ASEAN member 
states to criticize how Myanmar has treated the Rohingya. During the 2018 ASEAN Summit 
chaired by Singapore, the Chairman’s Statement offered weak criticism of Myanmar’s handling 
of the crisis, but refrained from directly accusing Myanmar of committing human rights 
violations.91 These recent events highlight that the creation of a new human rights body has not 
substantially altered ASEAN’s strategy for addressing human rights violations in Myanmar. In 
accordance with the norm of non-interference, the body still relies on discussion and a mild 
degree of public shaming to promote human rights without directly intervening in the internal 
affairs of its member states. 
Institutional efforts to address the Rohingya crisis have been limited to discussion and 
mild criticism of Myanmar for two reasons. First, the AICHR’s institutional design severely limits 
the scope of action that can be taken in response to the crisis. The AICHR has been unable to 
fully address this crisis because it is essentially relegated to an advisory role which only has the 
power to provide recommendations to the ASEAN Secretariat; it does not possess the ability to 
significantly punish Myanmar or provide support to the Rohingya. In addition, the body’s 
reliance on consensus-based decision-making, as mandated by the AICHR Terms of Reference, 
further weakens its ability to respond to the Rohingya crisis because Myanmar would 
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essentially have to agree to punitive measures and consent to the internationalization of its 
domestic affairs.92 Second, the norm of non-interference strongly discourages policy measures 
which would require ASEAN to intervene in a member state’s domestic affairs. In accordance 
with the norm of non-interference, ASEAN member states would choose to intervene in 
Myanmar only if the Rohingya crisis began to affect overall regional stability, as demonstrated 
by the case of intervention in response to unrest in East Timor in 1999. The case of the 
Rohingya crisis highlights the insufficiency of ASEAN’s current institutional mechanisms for 
protecting human rights and the need for drastic reforms to the organization’s formal 
mechanisms for protecting human rights. 
f. Conclusion and Future Outlook 
ASEAN’s current formal mechanisms for protecting and promoting human rights 
severely limit the ability of the organization to respond to human rights abuses. Furthermore, 
as shown by ASEAN’s response to the Rohingya crisis, political demand to address major human 
rights crises is currently insufficient to spark robust responses to human rights crises. This 
fundamental weakness is evidenced by the fact that the human rights records of multiple 
ASEAN member states have actually worsened since the creation of the AICHR and the passage 
of the AHRD. Unfortunately, given the broader context of the politics of human rights in 
Southeast Asia, significant reform of the organization’s formal human rights mechanisms seems 
unlikely. The structural weaknesses of the AICHR, the weak language in the AHRD, and the 
prominence of the norm of non-interference all demonstrate an institutional lack of political 
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will to forcefully address human rights violations occurring in ASEAN member states. Cynical 
scholars, such as Narine, view ASEAN’s formal human rights mechanisms as a part of an effort 
to rehabilitate the organization’s credibility and relieve itself from international pressure to 
conform to human rights norms.93 As a result, significant reform to ASEAN’s formal mechanisms 
for protecting and promoting human rights is unlikely.  
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Chapter Three  
Evaluating the Relationship Between ASEAN and Civil Society: Does ASEAN 
Suppress Civil Society’s Ability to Diffuse Human Rights Norms? 
 In contrast with the previous chapter, which evaluated formal mechanisms explicitly 
designed to address human rights issues, this chapter will analyze ASEAN’s relationship with 
civil society organizations – an important actor in the process of diffusing human rights norms. 
First, this section will begin with a theoretical overview of the incentives that drive 
collaboration between IGOs and civil society organizations. Next, this section will examine the 
strained relationship between ASEAN and civil society organizations; in particular, it will focus 
on how ASEAN systematically excludes civil society organizations focused on human rights 
issues from its decision-making processes before concluding that ASEAN is unlikely to change its 
approach to cooperating with civil society organizations due to the lack of incentives for 
cooperation. Afterward, this section will analyze ASEAN’s efforts to cooperate with civil society 
on the issue of the rights of migrant laborers. Initially, it appears that such cooperation 
disproves the notion that ASEAN is completely unwilling to cooperate with civil society on 
human rights issues. This section’s analysis of ASEAN’s response to this issue, however, 
concludes that collaboration between these two actors on the issue of migrant laborer rights is 
largely the result of unique circumstances and incentives that do not exist for other human 
rights issues. Finally, this section concludes with a brief discussion about how the strained 
relationship between ASEAN and civil society affects the diffusion of human rights norms 
throughout the region.  
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a. Theoretical Background: Why Does the Relationship Between IGOs and Civil Society 
Matter for the Protection of Human Rights? 
While IGOs and civil society organizations are both critical international actors, the 
importance of their relationship is not necessarily obvious. In part, this stems from the lack of 
literature on the relationship between these two types of actors. While there is plenty of 
literature which discusses the role that IGOS and civil society organizations play in international 
relations and the process of “norm diffusion” discussed in Chapter One, the literature 
elaborating on the manner in which the two types of actors interact in the international system 
is significantly less robust. Nonetheless, there are theoretical frameworks which predict 
circumstances which encourage cooperation between IGOs and civil society. Steffek, in 
particular, finds that there are many “push factors” which lead civil society organizations to 
seek assistance from IGOs as well as “pull factors” which lead IGOs to seek cooperative 
opportunities with civil society organizations. “Push factors” include a desire for a civil society 
organization to seek funding from an IGO or a desire to cooperate with an IGO for the purpose 
of advocacy and elevating the importance of a particular issue on the international stage.94 
“Pull factors” which incentivize IGOs to seek assistance from civil society organizations, 
meanwhile, are primarily linked to questions of policy. In particular, IGOs reach out to civil 
society for consultation on policy formulation or implementation.95 
While Steffek’s theoretical framework is primarily designed to explain the general 
relationship between IGOs and civil society organizations, it reveals two key points that are 
                                                     
94 Jens Steffek, “Explaining Cooperation Between IGOs and NGOs – Push Factors, Pull Factors, and the Policy 
Cycle,” Review of International Studies 39 (2013), 1006. 
95 Ibid, 1003-1004. 
 35 
important to keep in mind when discussing how this relationship impacts cooperation on 
human rights issues. First, this framework reiterates the importance of both parties’ willingness 
to engage with each other. If IGOs do not wish to meaningfully engage with civil society 
organizations or vice versa, then cooperation should not be expected. While this point might 
initially seem obvious, it means that an IGO must be interested in working with civil society 
organizations as a part of its broader approach towards human rights. Second, this framework 
indirectly highlights the role that incentives play in determining whether these two types of 
actors will cooperate. Civil society organizations may seek the assistance of an IGO, but unless 
the IGO believes that it can gain tangible benefits in terms of pursuing its policy goals, 
meaningful cooperation is unlikely.96 In sum, the insights from Steffek’s framework show that 
IGOs are willing to empower civil society activities in the domain of human rights if the 
organization is committed to upholding human rights and believes that engaging with civil 
society is necessary to achieve its policy goals. 
b. The Relationship Between ASEAN and Civil Society: A Lack of Opportunity for Formal 
Engagement 
At the time of ASEAN’s founding in 1967, civil society did not have a robust presence in 
Southeast Asia. This trend continued for the following two decades, as evidenced by the results 
of a 1986 survey which concluded that the total number of civil society organizations in the 
region was low given the scope of issues that civil society covers and the substantial population 
of ASEAN member states.97 In the early 1990s, this trend began to change and civil society 
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organizations – including those focused on human rights issues – began to appear throughout 
the region. In response to this trend, ASEAN saw an opportunity to bring these organizations 
into the fold as a part of an initiative to create a “people-oriented ASEAN.” In the late 1990s, as 
part of ASEAN’s Vision 2020 initiative, member states agreed to pursue “a community of caring 
societies”98 in which “civil society was empowered.”99 This desire to cooperate with civil society 
organizations was restated in future institutional documents, such as the Bali Concord II and the 
Vientiane Action Program before being codified in Article 16 of the ASEAN Charter, which 
stipulated that the organization may “engage with entities which support the ASEAN 
Charter.”100 The official language used to describe ASEAN’s efforts to engage with civil society 
weakened over time; however, the official commitment to cooperation was abundantly clear in 
foundational documents. 
In tandem with this rhetoric, ASEAN has also established initiatives designed to 
encourage cooperation with civil society organizations. It is important to note, however, that 
these initiatives are deeply flawed and give ASEAN the power to severely restrict the type of 
civil society organizations that can officially participate in public spaces. This is especially the 
case for organizations that work on issues related to human rights, which often involves the use 
of “naming and shaming” tactics. There are two major initiatives related to empowering that 
ASEAN has pursued over the course of the past two decades. The first has been the 
establishment of an accreditation system which allows civil society organizations to become 
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officially affiliated with ASEAN. While this system seemingly establishes the legitimacy of civil 
society in Southeast Asia, it is deeply flawed because ASEAN has the ability to choose which 
organizations receive accreditation.101 As a result, out of the 53 civil society organizations that 
are formally affiliated with ASEAN, not one has an explicit focus on human rights and most are 
business-oriented.102 Second, ASEAN has allowed civil society organizations to participate on 
informal consultations on specific issues; for instance, civil society organizations are allowed to 
participate in annual forums on migrant workers as well as general social welfare. Much like the 
accreditation system, however, ASEAN has the ability to choose which civil society 
organizations are invited to these forums.103 These strict controls over affiliation which only 
allows civil society organizations deemed to have “the same intentions as ASEAN” to participate 
in such forums. As a result, ASEAN has the ability to bar civil society organizations which are 
critical of organizational policies as well as those of member states.104 
In addition to problems with ASEAN’s official mechanisms for engaging with civil society, 
there are two other institutional factors which either discourage or outright prevent civil 
society organizations focused on human rights from engaging with ASEAN. First, there are strict 
restrictions on the nature of participation allowed by accredited civil society organizations. Such 
organizations are only guaranteed the ability to submit written statements to the ASEAN 
Committee of Permanent Representatives. All other activities possible through affiliation, such 
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as presenting information to ASEAN subcommittees or attending official meetings, require 
official approval. As a result, ASEAN possesses the ability to limit the influence of civil society 
organizations with advocacy focused on human rights or social issues. Second, ASEAN only 
cooperates with civil society on a narrow set of civil society issues, such as economic 
development and social welfare. Civil society organizations which focus on controversial issues, 
such as human rights, are not granted opportunities to engage with ASEAN officials. This is 
evidenced by the exclusion of civil society organizations from the drafting process of the AHRD 
as well as the annual ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium of Human Rights.105  
These structures, which allow ASEAN to avoid substantially engaging with civil society 
organizations performing work on issues related to human rights, have forced regional civil 
society organizations which focus on human rights issues to turn to other activities to support 
their advocacy efforts. In particular, these types of civil society organizations tend to employ 
three types of tactics for participation outside formally sanctioned spaces. First, these 
organizations hold activities parallel to official ASEAN gatherings which mimic a variety of 
official events, such as workshops and conferences. Importantly, these “created spaces” do not 
involve any interaction with ASEAN itself, but merely serve as an opportunity for civil society 
organizations to highlight their perspective on controversial issues and their exclusion from 
official dialogues.106 Second, civil society organizations focusing on controversial issues will 
stage protests as a form of political participation outside formal ASEAN spaces.107 Finally, these 
organizations will conduct research, draft documents such as policy memos or promotional 
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materials, and disseminate them to both citizens and ASEAN officials.108 In spite of ASEAN’s 
efforts to suppress the effectiveness of civil society organizations focused on human rights 
issues, they still have a multitude of tactics available to promote their causes and hasten the 
process of diffusing human rights norms throughout the region. Importantly, none of these 
activities are as effective as official consultations with ASEAN at spearheading the norm 
diffusion process. Out of all of these three types of activities in “created spaces” documented 
by Gerard, just one resulted in significant policy changes.109 In general, official consultations 
tend to be more effective at spreading human rights norms because they allow civil society 
organizations to directly advocate for their causes. Other activities, such as protests and 
information distribution, are forms of indirect advocacy that are prone to suppression by the 
governments of host countries. Thus, ASEAN’s limited official interaction with civil society 
organizations focused on human rights forces such organizations to turn to less effective forms 
of advocacy. 
While it is inaccurate to suggest that ASEAN ignores civil society altogether, it is clear 
that the organization fails to meaningfully engage with civil society organizations that are 
primarily focused on human rights. Considering the logic of Steffek’s framework, outlined in the 
previous section, helps explain why this is the case. Since human rights as a whole do not seem 
to be an organizational priority, as evidenced by the general ineffectiveness of ASEAN’s formal 
human rights instruments, it is logical that there is not an incentive for cooperation with civil 
society organizations focused on this particular issue area. Furthermore, the existence of the 
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norm of non-interference serves as a disincentive for cooperation with civil society 
organizations focused on human rights since they would be likely to criticize the internal affairs 
of member states in the process. Unless there is a significant change in organizational priorities, 
it is difficult to imagine that ASEAN’s approach towards human rights civil society organizations 
will significantly change.  
c. Advocacy for the Rights Migrant of Laborers: A Potential Counterexample? 
The movement of low-income, unskilled workers throughout Southeast Asia has 
become an important domestic political issue in many states throughout Southeast Asia. Within 
ASEAN member states, it is estimated that approximately 1.5 million people move abroad per 
year to find work. Furthermore, a vast majority of migrant workers, totaling upwards of 13.5 
million people, move between ASEAN member states. In addition to the economic and political 
impacts of migration, there is also concern that such migrants are at a high risk of exploitation, 
human trafficking, and working in abusive conditions.110  
In light of the abuses that migrant laborers in Southeast Asia face, the protection of 
migrant laborers is undoubtedly a human rights issue. Given the information presented both 
earlier in this chapter as well as the prior chapter, it would be logical to expect that ASEAN has 
not mounted a robust regional response to this issue. Yet, the opposite seems to be true. In 
2007, member states agreed to pass the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of 
the Rights of Migrant Workers. Furthermore, the organization has also hosted multiple 
conferences on the issue of migrant labor as well as several consultation sessions with regional 
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civil society organizations.111 The protection of migrant laborers seems to receive significantly 
more attention from ASEAN than other human rights issues. Interestingly, however, this issue 
did not become an organizational priority until regional civil society organizations implored 
ASEAN to prioritize this issue. The primary goal of this section is to explain why ASEAN 
responded to demands from civil society to mount a substantive response to abuses of migrant 
laborers, but failed to meaningfully engage with regional civil society in response to other 
allegations of human rights violations. This section will begin with a brief overview of civil 
society’s advocacy efforts in the domain of migrant worker rights before subsequently detailing 
ASEAN’s response. Finally, this section will conclude by analyzing several potential explanations 
for why ASEAN was responsive to demands from civil society for the protection of migrant 
laborers, but not for other human rights issues. 
Civil society advocacy efforts have played an important role in the establishment of 
protections for migrant workers in ASEAN. In particular, regional networks of domestic civil 
society organizations have carried out a majority of the advocacy work for this issue area. The 
most prominent of these organizations has been Migrant Forum Asia (MFA). This regional 
network consisting of more than 47 civil society organizations and trade associations was 
established for the purpose of building alliances between migrant labor advocates and creating 
a pan-Asian advocacy group for the protection of migrant laborers’ rights. As a parent 
organization within a larger regional network of civil society organizations, MFA primarily serves 
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as a coordinator for domestic campaigns to cooperate on regional advocacy projects.112 In 
addition to MFA, other regional civil society networks such as the Task Force on ASEAN Migrant 
Workers and international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch have become heavily involved in campaigns for the protection of migrant 
laborers in Southeast Asia as well.113 
While advocacy efforts from local and state-level civil society organizations have largely 
failed, as evidenced by the suppression of activists protesting the treatment of migrant laborers 
in Singapore and Malaysia,114 these efforts have spurred change on a regional level. ASEAN has 
pursued several initiatives related to the protection of migrant workers. In 2007, member 
states agreed to adopt the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers. While this document is non-binding (thus leaving enforcement to individual 
member states) and only covers a limited scope of rights, it still serves as a milestone because it 
codified migrant worker rights into regional law. After this document was signed, the 
organization established the ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers in 2008 and convened the 
first annual ASEAN Forum on Migrant Labor. Both of these initiatives were designed to create 
avenues to allow for cooperation between ASEAN and civil society organizations by serving as 
platforms “for discussion and the exchange of views and ideas among stakeholders on labor 
migration issues.”115 In sum, ASEAN has responded to pressure from regional civil society 
organizations and has created consultation mechanisms for regional civil society organizations. 
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ASEAN’s willingness to engage civil society on the issue of migrant worker rights, 
however, raises questions about why the organization chooses to engage with civil society 
organizations on this particular issue area, but not other issue areas related to human rights. 
Examining this issue from the perspective of Steffek’s framework, however, provides an 
explanation to this phenomenon. ASEAN views policy towards migrant laborers as an issue of 
regional security and social policy rather than as one of humanitarian policy. In other words, 
ASEAN views this issue as important because it is not framed as a humanitarian issue. This 
framing can be seen in the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers, which stipulates that the protection of migrant workers is necessary to 
achieve “a common vision of a secure and prosperous ASEAN community.”116 Individual 
member states also view the issue of migrant workers through the lens of regional security as 
well. Malaysia, for instance, has viewed the issue of foreign migrant workers as a security issue, 
as evidenced by various statements from government officials and the creation of a volunteer 
paramilitary force – the People’s Volunteer Corps – tasked with the responsibility to identify 
migrant workers that are illegally present in the country.117 Since both the organization itself 
and individual countries view this issue as one of security rather as a humanitarian issue, it 
should not be surprising that ASEAN is receptive to the idea of collaborating with civil society 
organizations. While ASEAN’s collaboration with civil society organizations on the issue of 
protecting the rights of migrant laborers seems to disprove the notion that it is completely 
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unwilling to work with civil society on issues related to human rights, the unique circumstances 
and framing of this issue mean that cooperation between the two parties on other issues is 
unlikely. 
d. Concluding Remarks 
The inability of human rights-focused civil society organizations to engage with ASEAN, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, has severely impacted their ability to diffuse norms throughout the 
region. While these organizations conduct activities in parallel spaces, these activities are not 
effective at spearheading the norm diffusion process in comparison to official consultations 
with ASEAN governments. Until ASEAN feels an incentive to engage with civil society, it is 
unlikely that there will be meaningful engagement between these two actors. 
Importantly, the case of migrant worker rights shows that ASEAN would potentially be 
willing to engage with civil society on humanitarian issues that are framed as issues of regional 
security or social policy.  As a result, it is possible to extend this logic to argue that if civil society 
organizations can reshape the debate about a particular humanitarian issue, the odds of ASEAN 
granting them a formal meeting would increase as a result. One problem with extending this 
logic to all potential humanitarian issues, however, is that there still is not any evidence which 
suggests that civil society organizations are capable of changing the framing of debates over 
such issues. In the case of the rights of migrant workers, governments and ASEAN itself were 
responsible for how the issue was framed rather than civil society. The ability of civil society 
organizations, meanwhile, to reframe the debate is limited given limited freedom of the press 
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in many ASEAN member states118 as well as the existing structural problems with the 
relationship between these organizations and ASEAN. As a result, interactions between ASEAN 
and civil society about migrant worker rights should not be seen as a cause for optimism. 
Ultimately, regional civil society organizations focused on human rights are left with few 
meaningful options for diffusing human rights norms in Southeast Asia. Since these 
organizations do not have the ability to formally consult with ASEAN and their prospects of 
successfully reframing debates about humanitarian issues are limited at best, these 
organizations are forced to turn to alternate methods of engagement in parallel spaces that are 
highly ineffective. Since many of these problems are linked back to structural issues in the 
relationship between these two actors caused by perverse incentives, it is unlikely that ASEAN 
will play a significant role in assisting in the diffusion of human rights norms. If anything, ASEAN 
is slowing the diffusion of human rights norms in the region by forcing civil society organization 
to turn to less effective methods of advocating for human rights.  
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 Chapter Four  
Comparing ASEAN’s Human Rights Regime with Other Regional Institutions: Are 
ASEAN’s Problems Unique? 
 From the previous two chapters, it is abundantly clear that ASEAN’s overall human 
rights regime is ineffective as a catalyst for encouraging the protection and promotion of 
human rights. ASEAN’s weak formal human rights institutions are unable to effectively mount 
responses to humanitarian crises and punish states which consistently abuse human rights. 
Meanwhile, ASEAN’s treatment of regional civil society organizations forces them to turn to less 
effective means of advocacy, which means that the body is actively impeding the process of 
norm diffusion. In sum, ASEAN’s organizational commitment to human rights is weak at best 
and actively harmful at worst. This section aims to examine whether these problems are 
present in other regional human rights bodies. In particular, this section will evaluate the 
efforts of the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, and the African Union to 
protect and promote human rights. Each of these three comparisons begins with an overview 
of the organization’s structure before subsequently comparing its initiatives to protect and 
promote human rights with ASEAN’s efforts. The ultimate goal of these comparisons is to 
determine whether the problems that ASEAN faces can be found in other regional human rights 
organizations.  
a. Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe (COE) is an intergovernmental organization whose membership 
consists of 49 European member states. According to the Statute of the Council of Europe, the 
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purpose of the organization is to “achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose 
of . . . common heritage and facilitating . . . economic and social progress.”119 While the COE 
was not explicitly established as a rights-based organization, many of its most notable 
accomplishments are in the realm of protecting and promoting human rights. In 1950, the 
organization was responsible for drafting the European Convention on Human Rights – a 
prominent regional human rights treaty which explicitly protects a wide range of civil and 
political rights. As a result, the body serves as the region’s most prominent body for addressing 
various issues in the realm of human rights.120 
In addition to articulating a list of key civil and political rights, the Convention also 
mandated the creation of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which is a supranational 
judicial body responsible for hearing cases of alleged human rights violations committed by 
member states. Individuals, groups, and other member states all possess the ability to file 
complaints and apply for hearings in front of a judge. If a hearing is granted, the Court reviews 
the case and assesses whether the defendant member states violated one of the Convention’s 
protocols. The Court’s decisions are final and defendants do not possess the ability to appeal its 
judgments. The implementation of its decisions is overseen by the COE’s Committee of 
Ministers, which is tasked with the responsibility of working with guilty defendants to ensure 
that decisions are implemented and enforced. While the Court does not possess the ability to 
overrule domestic law, it possesses the power to ensure that states compensate victims of 
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human rights violations.121 Thus, unlike the AICHR and other bodies within ASEAN’s human 
rights architecture, the Court possesses an imperfect enforcement mechanism that allows the 
COE to achieve its mission of promoting and protecting human rights in Europe. 
In addition to the existence of an enforcement mechanism, the COE and ASEAN also 
radically differ in their ability to diffuse human rights norms. This largely stems from two 
factors. First, the COE possesses a greater amount of power to disseminate norms amongst 
member states due to its strong sense of regional legitimacy. The organization’s rise to 
prominence as a defender of individual liberties and its ballooning caseload are both indicative 
of its status; furthermore, newly-democratizing countries in Europe actually view COE 
membership as a “badge of legitimacy and a bulwark against authoritarianism.”122 This 
legitimacy has given it the influence to rally support for several protocols amending the 
Convention to enumerate new civil and political rights, such as the right to education, the right 
to property, and the right for citizens to freely move within a country.123 While the COE cannot 
force individual member states to sign or ratify these protocols, the process of introducing 
amendments to the Convention allows for the organization to act as a norm entrepreneur that 
possesses the ability to introduce norms and persuade states to adopt them through tactics of 
persuasion.124 
Second, unlike ASEAN, the COE cooperates with regional civil society organizations 
focused on human rights to a much greater degree than ASEAN. In 1998, the COE established 
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the North-South Centre, which seeks to promote a wide variety of values including human 
rights to its members. This sub-organization achieves this goal by working with civil society 
organizations to promote a strong human rights culture within its member states.125 
Additionally, the COE also holds an annual civil society conference – the Conference of INGOs – 
in which civil society organizations are invited to testify to the body’s Parliamentary Assembly. 
Importantly, the existence of this conference means that the COE is the only regional 
intergovernmental organization which regularly holds forums explicitly designed to provide 
opportunities for consultative sessions between a regional IGO and civil society organizations. 
Thus, the COE uniquely stands out in its ability to engage with civil society in comparison to its 
peers.126 
The COE’s efforts to promote and protect human rights are clearly more robust in 
comparison to those of ASEAN. It is important to note, however, that this could partially be 
explained by the simple fact that the notion of human rights originated in the West. Along with 
the United States, countries in Western Europe were the main initial advocates for passing the 
UDHR. Furthermore, the major strands of philosophical thought – natural law and liberalism – 
which underpin human rights law originate from the West as well.127 As a result, it should not 
be surprising that Europe has a strong regional system for human rights.  
b. Organization of American States 
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The Organization of American States (OAS) is a regional IGO whose memberships 
consists of the 35 independent states in the Americas, including the United States. Much like 
ASEAN, this organization was founded for the purpose of facilitating cooperation between 
member states, ensuring regional security, and promoting representative democracy with 
respect for the principle of non-intervention. As a result, OAS member states have collaborated 
on issues ranging from poverty and development to the eradication of corruption. Since the 
organization’s inception, human rights have been one of the most contentious and prominent 
issues that OAS has attempted to tackle. In 1959, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR) was established for the purpose of enforcing the protection of rights outlined in 
three documents: the OAS Charter, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). Each of these three documents 
outlines core rights to be protected; importantly, these documents enumerated civil and 
political rights as well as economic, cultural, and social rights. The IACHR has the power to 
enforce the provisions of these documents through its ability to serve as a dispute mediator 
and its role as a body which handles human rights cases.128 
In addition, much like the European human rights system, the OAS system of human 
rights contains a judicial branch. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is responsible for 
hearing cases and determining whether an OAS member state is responsible for violating 
human rights. Unlike in the European system, however, individuals cannot refer cases to the 
Court. Instead, they must file a complaint with the IACHR, which possesses the power to 
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determine whether a case should be referred to the Court. If a case is referred to the Court, a 
panel of judges will review the case and determine whether is guilty of violating human rights. 
Much like the European system, the Court has the power to issue judgments, order guilty states 
to remedy breaches of human rights, and compel member states to compensate victims when 
appropriate. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the ability of this system to function depends on the 
willingness of states to generally respect human rights and accept the Court’s decisions.129 
Member states have the ability to withdraw their acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction at any 
time; for instance, Trinidad and Tobago withdrew from the Court’s jurisdiction in 1998 due to 
disputes over the death penalty.130 In conjunction with the existence of the organization’s 
principle of non-interference, this case shows that while the Court possesses the ability to 
enforce human rights in the region, it cannot force OAS member states to comply with human 
rights treaties. 
In addition, OAS has intensified its efforts to engage with regional civil society 
organizations, including those focused on human rights. Cooperation between these two 
entities is not a new phenomenon; the OAS and civil society organizations have cooperated on 
a wide variety of issues, including human rights. Currently, the organizational process engaging 
with civil society organizations is haphazard and occurs on an ad-hoc basis.131 In general, the 
OAS tends to consult with civil society organizations on issues of the environment, 
development, and human rights in exchange for allowing these organizations to attend most 
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OAS meetings as special guests or observers.132 Member states have attempted to structure 
interactions between the OAS and civil society organizations by organizing summits hosted by 
three separate member states over the span of seven years. These conferences all resulted in 
the creation of three separate systems for organizing civil society participation. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the creation of multiple systems for civil society participation in OAS caused two 
inefficiencies in how interactions between these two parties are structured. First, the existence 
of multiple mechanisms for facilitating interactions between the OAS and civil society 
organizations means that there is a high risk of contradictory standards for how these bodies 
may interact with each other. Second, by spreading interactions across multiple systems, both 
civil society organizations and the OAS itself are not using their resources as effectively as 
possible. Finally, since consultations between these two parties are spread out across different 
participatory mechanisms, information gained from such interactions may not be shared 
effectively across all these bodies.133 While it is abundantly clear that OAS is inclusive of civil 
society organizations, efforts to reform these interactions must be pursued in order to ensure 
that both parties gain as much as possible from these interactions. 
While the overall OAS human rights system is weaker than its European counterpart, it 
is abundantly clear that it is stronger than the ASEAN system both in terms of its ability to 
punish states for human rights violations and its willingness to interact with civil society 
organizations. The existence of a judicial branch in the OAS’ human rights apparatus and 
mechanisms for interacting with civil society demonstrate a strong organizational commitment 
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to protect and promote human rights. While these OAS mechanisms are imperfect, they are still 
stronger than the equivalent ASEAN mechanisms because they attempt to seriously address 
regional human rights issues.  
c. African Union 
In 1963, the Organization of African States (the predecessor to the African Union) was 
conceived for the purpose of safeguarding independence in the wake of colonialism and 
promoting regional unity. Initially, human rights were not an organizational priority, as 
evidenced by the fact that they only received a passing mention in the organization’s charter. In 
1981, however, member states passed the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
which served as the region’s first legally-binding human rights treaty. While this treaty 
stipulates core human rights that member states are obligated to protect, it contains several 
flaws which prevent it from being a completely effective human rights instrument. Article 6, for 
instance, stipulates that no one may be deprived of their freedoms or rights “except for reasons 
and conditions previously laid down by law.”134 The document does not properly define 
conditions that could be used as grounds for denying an individual their rights; as a result, it is 
theoretically possible for states to invoke this clause in the document as grounds for justifying 
just about any type of human rights violation. This lack of specificity, which is present 
throughout the document, severely hampers its ability to serve as an effective legally-binding 
treaty. 
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In addition, the Charter also mandated the creation of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), which was created six years after the document’s passage 
in 1987. According to the Charter, the ACHPR is responsible for the promotion rather than the 
protection of human rights. More specifically, the body has the power to conduct 
investigations, cooperate with member states and other international actors to encourage the 
promotion of human rights, and develop rules to solve legal problems related to the protection 
of human rights. Importantly, this means that the ACHPR does not possess the power to punish 
consistent violators of human rights since it only possesses investigative and advisory 
powers.135 Furthermore, the ACHPR also suffers from a lack of resources as well as problems 
related to states failing to meet requirements to report on the human rights situations in their 
countries.136 As a result, the ACHPR can best be characterized as an ineffective body with 
limited powers and resources. 
In 2004, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established to serve as a 
judicial branch of the African human rights system. Much like the judicial branches of the 
European and American systems, the Court is responsible for hearing cases of alleged human 
rights abuses committed by states that have accepted its jurisdiction (currently, 30 out of 55 
African Union member states have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction).137 Furthermore, much like 
its counterparts in other regions, the Court possesses the power to issue legally-binding 
judgments against member states which violate human rights and require them to either 
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compensate victims or provide restitution. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this means that the Court 
suffers from many of the same flaws as other judicial branches of regional human rights 
organizations. The Court does not possess the ability to overrule domestic law; furthermore, 
states also have the ability to withdraw from the body at any time.138 In addition, the African 
Court is also flawed because individuals or civil society organizations do not have the ability to 
bring cases before the court unless a state passes a declaration accepting the right of individual 
jurisdiction. Currently, just nine African Union (AU) member states have accepted this right. As 
a result, this means that in most states that accept the Court’s jurisdiction, the only actors with 
the power to bring cases to the Court is the ACHPR.139 While the Court is an important facet of 
the African human rights system, it is also deeply flawed. 
In terms of interactions with civil society, Article 45 of the African Charter of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights stipulates that the ACHPR is obligated to collaborate with civil society 
organizations.140 In practice, this collaboration happens in three ways. First, the interactions can 
occur in an informal setting outside of officially-sanctioned AU spaces, such as conferences in 
which both the IGO and civil society community are attendees. Second, the ACHPR works with a 
number of recognized “observer” civil society organizations that are invited to participate in its 
meetings and provide consultations. Unlike ASEAN’s process for approving civil society 
organizations, this process is not used to prevent human rights-based civil society from 
interacting with ACHPR. Rather, the registration process is primarily used to ensure that civil 
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society organizations are actually involved in regional human rights activities and are not 
misusing their finances.141 Currently, there are over 500 civil society organizations that have 
been granted observer status by the ACHPR.142 Finally, civil society organizations have the 
ability to file complaints of alleged human rights violations to the ACHPR.143 Ultimately, it is 
clear that the ACHPR is making a meaningful effort to include civil society organizations in its 
processes. 
While the ACHPR is an imperfect regional human rights body due to its limited scope of 
powers and lack of an enforcement mechanism, it is clear that the body acts in a good-faith 
effort to promote and protect human rights in the region. This is demonstrated by its efforts to 
meaningfully include regional civil society organizations in its proceedings as well as the 
existence of a complaints mechanism for both state and non-state actors. Even though the 
African human rights system is imperfect, it is reasonable to claim that the African system is 
more effective at promoting human rights because it allows for input from non-governmental 
actors. 
d. Conclusion 
While all regional human rights bodies are imperfect due to their inability to serve as 
supranational organizations, it is abundantly clear that the ASEAN human rights system is 
significantly weaker than those of other human rights bodies. All other regional human rights 
bodies examined in this section have a formal complaints mechanism; furthermore, all regional 
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human rights systems contain a judicial branch with the power to levy judgments against 
member states guilty of human rights violations. Furthermore, ASEAN also falls short in its 
willingness to engage with human rights-based civil society organizations. The three other 
regional human rights systems examined in this section have all made some attempt to consult 
civil society, while ASEAN has actively excluded civil society organizations from its decision-
making processes. 
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Conclusion 
Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations 
 The ASEAN human rights system suffers from structural and institutional weaknesses 
which have limited its effectiveness and rendered it as one of the world’s most ineffective 
regional human rights bodies. While all regional human rights bodies must navigate the 
constraints of state sovereignty and find creative ways to promote human rights, the ASEAN 
system is uniquely inadequate for ensuring the protection and promotion of human rights in 
Southeast Asia. This ineffectiveness is demonstrated by the lack of an enforcement mechanism 
with the AICHR, the weak terms of the AHRD, and the refusal of ASEAN to meaningfully engage 
with human rights-focused civil society organizations. This section will draw upon the lessons 
learned from the previous three chapters to recommend six proposed reforms to the ASEAN 
human rights system in order to increase its overall efficacy. The proposed changes to the body 
are as follows: the expansion of the organization’s mandate to include the protection of human 
rights, the removal of consensus-based decision making, the establishment of a formal 
complaints mechanism, the creation of a judiciary body, and the expansion of the accreditation 
process for regional civil society organizations. 
1. Expansion of the AICHR’s Mandate 
 One factor which explains the ineffectiveness of the AICHR is that its Terms of Reference 
constrain the actions it can take in response to allegations of human rights violations. In 
particular, this document stipulates that the body ought to focus on the promotion of human 
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rights rather than on their protection.144 Perhaps unsurprisingly, this mandate eliminates 
punitive policy options and prevents the body from taking steps to enforce human rights. This 
particular barrier to action could be eliminated if the scope of the Terms of Reference were 
expanded and the AICHR was explicitly given the power to protect human rights through 
measures such as conducting investigations into allegations of human rights abuses, 
establishing operations to monitor civil and political liberties in fragile states, and punishing 
consistent violators of human rights. Admittedly, this policy recommendation is also critical for 
many of the other proposed recommendations in this section as well. 
2. Ending Reliance on Consensus-Based Decision-Making 
 In addition, the AICHR’s Terms of Reference should be scrubbed of all references to the 
system of consensus-based decision-making. This form of decision-making is problematic 
because it paralyzes action, incentivizes consensus at the lowest common denominator, and 
gives states the power to “reject . . . criticisms of [their] human rights record by veto.”145 The 
Rohingya case study, in particular, illustrates many of the problems associated with ASEAN’s 
reliance on consensus-based decision-making. Myanmar would essentially have to agree to 
censure itself in order for the body to mount any kind of substantive response to the crisis. If 
this form of decision-making was scrapped, then the AICHR would be able to take more swift 
and decisive action in response to human rights crises because one or two rogue states would 
not be able to block measures to prevent violations of civil and political rights. 
3. Establishment of a Formal Complaints Mechanism 
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 The AICHR should also establish a formal complaints mechanism so that individuals and 
civil society organizations have the ability to efficiently report violations of human rights. As 
noted in Chapter Two, the AICHR does not currently have such a mechanism in place, which 
makes it difficult for the body to gather information on developing human rights crises and take 
appropriate action in response.146 Thus, the creation of a channel for receiving complaints 
would undoubtedly increase the overall effectiveness of the AICHR. 
4. The Creation of a Judicial Body 
 In addition, the AICHR should also attempt to create a judicial body similar to those in 
Europe, the Americas, and Africa that is designed to hear cases and levy judgments against 
member states that are guilty of human rights violations. While these judicial bodies are 
imperfect due to their limited scope of action and their inability to trump domestic law, they 
nonetheless serve as important bodies for promoting a regional culture of respect for human 
rights. Furthermore, when these judicial bodies are effective, they have the ability to ensure 
that victims of human rights violations committed by states are properly compensated for their 
losses. As a result, ASEAN should pursue the creation of a regional human rights court. 
5. The Expansion of the Accreditation Process for Civil Society Organizations 
ASEAN’s current process for registering civil society organizations with is exclusionary 
because accreditation is only granted to organizations which are deemed to have “the same 
intentions as ASEAN.”147 As a result, ASEAN has the ability to disallow human rights-based civil 
society organizations from participating in officially-sanctioned spaces. Reforming the 
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accreditation process would allow for human rights-focused organizations to participate in 
these types of dialogues, which give them an opportunity to cooperate with ASEAN on issues 
related to human rights. Furthermore, this reform would give regional civil society 
organizations focused on human rights an opportunity to move away from the less effective 
forms of advocacy in “created spaces” detailed in Chapter Three and instead allow them to turn 
to more effective forms of advocacy which involve direct contact with ASEAN officials. 
Concluding Remarks: Are These Proposals Realistic? 
 These five proposed reforms would undoubtedly improve the efficacy of the overall 
ASEAN human rights system. It is unlikely, however, that ASEAN will adopt these reforms 
because they either run counter to the norm of non-interference or directly contradict existing 
organizational incentives. The first four proposed reforms involved explicitly granting the body 
some degree of power to intervene in the domestic affairs of member states, which means that 
they would violate the norm of non-interference. The fifth proposal, meanwhile, runs counter 
to incentives for ASEAN to avoid engaging with civil society organizations that could potentially 
be critical of ASEAN and its member states. Finally, it is worth noting that member states which 
consistently commit human rights violations would be unlikely to agree to measures that would 
increase the chances that they face consequences for their actions. Thus, while these proposed 
reforms would undoubtedly strengthen the overall ASEAN human rights system, they are 
unrealistic and unlikely to be implemented due to existing perverse incentives. 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the factors which explain why these proposed reforms are 
unlikely to be implemented reflect many of the overarching problems which plague the ASEAN 
human rights system. The impotence of the AICHR, the weakness of the AHRD, and the lack of 
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engagement with civil society can all be linked back to the existence of the norm of non-
interference as well as a general lack of political will to address human rights issues. The 
pessimism surrounding the long-term future of the ASEAN human rights system can be 
explained by the fact that these two factors which prevent meaningful responses to human 
rights issues are long-term structural issues that cannot easily be addressed. As a result, 
improvements to ASEAN’s human rights system can only be achieved in tandem with long-term 
reforms to the organization’s attitude towards human rights issues. The shortcomings of 
ASEAN’s human rights system, as well as those of other regional human rights systems, 
illustrate the cortical role that sovereignty plays in restraining the ability of regional IGOs to 
respond to international crises.   
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